CVE-2024-42098

{"id": "CVE-2024-42098", "cveTags": [], "metrics": {}, "published": "2024-07-29T18:15:12.247", "references": [{"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39173b04abda87872b43c331468a4a14f8f05ce8", "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}, {"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/73e5984e540a76a2ee1868b91590c922da8c24c9", "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}, {"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80575b252ab0358b7e93895b2a510beb3cb3f975", "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}, {"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d96187eb8e59b572a8e6a68b6a9837a867ea29df", "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}, {"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd7ef325911eba1b7191b83cb580463242f2090d", "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}], "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: ecdh - explicitly zeroize private_key\n\nprivate_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the\ncaller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key.\nHowever, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly\ngenerated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that\nscenario, some key material from the previous key would not be\noverwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire\nprivate_key array first.\n\nNote that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function:\npreviously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would\nremain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is\nconsistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid\nfails."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se resolvi\u00f3 la siguiente vulnerabilidad: crypto: ecdh: poner a cero expl\u00edcitamente la clave privada la clave privada se sobrescribe con el par\u00e1metro clave pasado por la persona que llama (si est\u00e1 presente) o, alternativamente, con una clave privada reci\u00e9n generada. Sin embargo, es posible que la persona que llama proporcione una clave (o la clave reci\u00e9n generada) que sea m\u00e1s corta que la clave anterior. En ese escenario, parte del material clave de la clave anterior no se sobrescribir\u00eda. La soluci\u00f3n m\u00e1s sencilla es poner primero a cero expl\u00edcitamente toda la matriz de claves privadas. Tenga en cuenta que este parche cambia ligeramente el comportamiento de esta funci\u00f3n: anteriormente, si ecc_gen_privkey fallaba, la antigua clave privada permanecer\u00eda. Ahora, la private_key siempre se pone a cero. Este comportamiento es coherente con el caso en el que se establece params.key y ecc_is_key_valid falla."}], "lastModified": "2024-07-30T13:33:30.653", "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"}