An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don't give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.
References
Link | Resource |
---|---|
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/173055/Nokia-ASIKA-7.13.52-Private-Key-Disclosure.html | Exploit Third Party Advisory VDB Entry |
https://Nokia.com | Product |
https://www.nokia.com/about-us/security-and-privacy/product-security-advisory/cve-2023-25187/ | Vendor Advisory |
Configurations
Configuration 1 (hide)
AND |
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History
No history.
Information
Published : 2023-06-16 20:15
Updated : 2023-06-29 19:17
NVD link : CVE-2023-25187
Mitre link : CVE-2023-25187
CVE.ORG link : CVE-2023-25187
JSON object : View
Products Affected
nokia
- asika_airscale
- asika_airscale_firmware
CWE
CWE-798
Use of Hard-coded Credentials